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Abstract—In this paper, a novel approach for optimizing and
managing resource allocation in wireless small cell networks
(SCNs) with device-to-device (D2D) communication is proposed.
The proposed approach allows to jointly exploit both the wireless
and social context of wireless users for optimizing the overall
allocation of resources and improving traffic offload in SCNs.
This context-aware resource allocation problem is formulated as
a matching game in which user equipments (UEs) and resource
blocks (RBs) rank one another, based on utility functions that
capture both wireless and social metrics. Due to social inter-
relations, this game is shown to belong to a class of matching
games with peer effects. To solve this game, a novel, self-
organizing algorithm is proposed, using which UEs and RBs
can interact to decide on their desired allocation. The proposed
algorithm is then proven to converge to a two-sided stable
matching between UEs and RBs. The properties of the resulting
stable outcome are then studied and assessed. Simulation results
using real social data show that clustering of socially connected
users allows to offload a substantially larger amount of traffic
than the conventional context-unaware approach. These results
show that exploiting social context has high practical relevance
in saving resources on the wireless links and on the backhaul.
Index Terms— wireless small cell networks; matching games;
heterogeneous networks; game theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
The introduction of smartphones and tablets has led to the
proliferation of bandwidth-intensive wireless services, such
as multimedia streaming and social networking, that have
strained the capacity of present-day wireless communication
networks [1]. This increasing trend led to the emergence of
wireless small cell networks (SCNs) as a promising solution
to meet the quality-of-service (QoS) requirements of such
emerging wireless services [2]–[5]. In SCNs, the main idea
is to massively deploy small cell base stations (SCBSs) with
relatively low transmit power, overlaid on existing cellular
infrastructure. Small cells allow to increase the capacity and
coverage of a wireless network by bringing the user equip-
ments (UEs) closer to their serving base stations. Nonetheless,
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the deployment of small cells introduces new challenges in
terms of interference management, resource allocation, and
network modeling. These challenges stem from many key
features of SCNs such as the unplanned SCBS distribution,
limited coverage, dense SCBS deployment, and limited back-
haul capacities, among others [2]–[9].
The authors in [6] proposed a control-based scheduler for
traffic management at small cells. In [7], an optimization
problem is solved at each cell to perform resource allo-
cation while taking into account cell range expansion and
offloading metrics. Most of these existing approaches mainly
adopt centralized methods for resource allocation [6], [7].
Although interesting, such centralized approaches have several
drawbacks since they assume the presence of a centralized
controller for the small cells, depend on SCBSs cooperation,
and require macro base station (MBS) coordination. However,
resource allocation in SCNs needs to be decentralized, self-
organizing, and computationally efficient; specifically when
the number of small cells increases. In this regard, game theory
has emerged as a popular tool to realize distributed approaches
for wireless networks [8]–[13]. In [8], the authors proposed
a distributed resource allocation in the uplink of a two tier
network, by posing the problem as a matching game. They
solved the game using the Hungarian algorithm. In [9], the
resource allocation in SCNs is formulated as an evolutionary
game. In [10], the theory of one-to-one and many-to-one
matching markets is extended for the resource allocation in
wireless networks. In [11], the authors used matching theory
to perform distributed scheduling at the downlink of a MIMO-
OFDMA system. Other works that apply matching in some
limited wireless settings are found in [12] and [13]. In fact,
prior works do not handle the challenges of SCNs that are
underlaid with device-to-device (D2D) connections and in
which there is a need not only to manage interference, but
to also account for redundant transmissions by exploiting the
ability of D2D to provide popular content caching. The body
of work in [8]–[13] focuses on resource allocation while only
accounting for classical physical layer metrics such as the
SINR and is restricted to networks without D2D. In addition, it
is based on the classical deferred acceptance algorithm which
cannot be applied for scenarios with peer effects such as in
our case. Context-aware resource allocation, as done in our
paper, is a new design paradigm that can help to boost the
performance of small cell networks and to exploit D2D for
popular content distribution.
Along with the use of SCNs for improving network per-
formance, D2D communications has recently emerged as an
interesting approach to provide proximity services to users
of an SCN, thus assisting in further offload of the cellular
system’s traffic [14]–[18]. Indeed, due to the evolution of nu-
merous data centric applications, it is very likely that devices
in proximity of one another tend to interact directly over
the wireless spectrum. Communication of such neighboring
devices via the infrastructure of the SCN (i.e., via SCBSs) is
neither spectrum nor power efficient [14]. In addition, SCNs
are envisioned to have a capacity-limited backhaul [4] and,
thus, the use of underlaid D2D can help offload traffic from
the SCNs’ backhaul. In this respect, D2D communication over
the cellular spectrum is viewed as an attractive candidate to
handle these scenarios [17]–[19]. D2D over cellular networks
is significantly different from D2D over unlicensed bands
such as WiFi or traditional short-range D2D via Zigbee and
Bluetooth. Indeed, D2D over cellular allows longer ranges
and higher QoS, while also requiring to properly manage
interference with cellular transmissions [15], [16], and [19].
Some of the main challenges associated with deploying the
D2D technology include introducing proximity services that
leverage D2D, managing the wireless resources in D2D de-
ployments, and protecting such low power and vulnerable
communication links from interference [14]–[17].
In addition to the conventional physical layer metrics to
optimize the SCN’s performance, modern UEs can offer a
versatile range of information from higher network layers that
could help to reap the prospective gains of D2D deployments
in SCNs. Such additional information, referred to as context
information, may include the data extracted from online social
networks [20]–[23], the history of a user’s throughput [24],
prediction of a user’s location [25], or the delay-throughput
tolerance of the applications [26]. The work in [20] develops
an analytical model for the epidemic information spreading
among mobile users of an ad hoc network. In [21], the resource
allocation in wireless LAN is defined as an optimization
problem, taking the notion of social distance into account.
The authors in [22] and [23] extend the work in [21] by
introducing new utility functions which again account for
the social distance of users, extracted from the social graph.
Existing context-aware works [20]–[26] are mostly tailored
to macrocell networks, are based on centralized approaches,
and do not address the SCN or D2D over SCN challenges.
In addition, although the use of social networks has been
demonstrated to be useful to improve wireless systems, most
existing works such as [20]–[23] are based solely on the phys-
ical aspects of the social network, e.g., centrality measures.
Such notion of social context is insufficient to capture common
interests. For example, the large number of friends of a user
in a social network does not necessarily mean that such a user
is influential enough to require more bandwidth. In contrast,
there is a need to adopt a more holistic view for the social
context by basing it on other social dimensions such as the
actual interactions between users. Here, we note that, although
another body of works such as [27]–[30] has further explored
the use of social metrics in networking applications, such
works are not adequate for deployment in wireless cellular
systems such as SCNs with D2D as they do not deal with
issues such as interference and network offload.
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a novel,
self-organizing, context-aware framework for optimizing re-
source allocation in D2D-enabled SCNs. We formulate the
problem as a two-sided one-to-one matching game in which
each UE is assigned to one resource block (RB). In this game,
the UEs and SCBS-controlled RBs rank one another based
on utilities that capture the social context of the users as
well as the wireless physical layer metrics. The social context
includes the information inferred from the social network
profiles of the wireless users. This information is mainly based
on the similarities between users’ interests, activities, and their
interactions such as tagging or wall posting. The proposed
scheme allows to exploit the fact that users who are strongly
connected in a social network are likely to request similar
type of data over the physical wireless network. We show that
the proposed game is a matching game with peer effects in
which the strategy of each player is affected by the decisions
of its peers. This is in contrast to most existing works on
matching theory for wireless networks [8]–[13] that deal with
conventional matching games in which there is no peer effect.
To solve this context-aware resource management game, we
propose a novel, self-organizing algorithm that allows to find
a stable matching between users and RBs. We show that our
proposed algorithm allows the SCBSs and UEs to interact and
converge to a stable matching with manageable complexity.
Simulation results using real traces are used to analyze the
performance of the proposed approach.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II describes the system model. Section III introduces the
modeling of social context in wireless D2D-enabled SCNs.
Section IV defines the problem as the matching game and
Section V presents the proposed algorithm. Simulation results
are analyzed in Section VI and conclusions are drawn in
Section VII.
Fig. 1. Physical model for interference management in a D2D enabled SCN.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider the downlink of an OFDMA small cell network
with a set L of L SCBSs randomly distributed within the
network. The total bandwidth B is divided into N RBs in the
set N and there are a total of M active users with M being the
set of all users. We consider a co-channel network deployment
in which the total bandwidth is shared between all small
cells. In this network, we assume that users can communicate
directly via D2D communication links within the cellular band.
Such D2D communications enhance the indoor coverage and
helps to offload the small cell traffic. In our model, some users
are chosen as a serving user equipment (SUE) that are allowed
to serve other UEs via D2D communication. Let Ms be the
set of Ms SUEs and Mu be the set of Mu non-serving UEs.
Thus, M =Ms ∪Mu and Ms ∩Mu = ∅. The criterion for
SUE selection is discussed further in Section III-A. Moreover,
let K =Ms ∪L be the joint set of all SCBSs and SUEs with
|K| = Ms + L. Hereinafter, we use the term “serving node
(SN)” to refer to either an SCBS or an SUE. Moreover, we
refer to cellular links and D2D links, respectively, as SCBSs
to UEs and SUEs to UEs links.
For resource allocation in D2D-enabled SCNs, one simple
approach is to allow the SCBSs to share all the RBs with the
SUEs. However, in such a scheme, the D2D communication
links will be dominated by the interference from the SCBSs.
To overcome this problem, we propose to divide the spectrum
in such a way that no mutual interference occurs between
SCBSs and SUEs. Consequently, the sources of interference
and the SINR relations will differ at each RB n ∈ N ,
depending on whether RB n is reused by an SCBS or an SUE.
In this model, D2D links, SCBS to SUE links, and cellular
links are separated in the frequency domain. Hence, the set
of resource blocks N , is divided into non-overlapping sets,
namely, N1, N2, and N3 as shown in Fig. 1. N1 and N2
represent the set of N1 and N2 RBs dedicated to the direct
links from SCBSs to UEs and SCBSs to SUEs, respectively. In
addition, N3 is the set of N3 dedicated RBs that are shared by
all SUEs for D2D transmission. We let hknm be the channel
state of subcarrier n ∈ N in the transmission from SN k to
user m. In this model, SCBSs may interfere with one another,
since they share subbands N1 and N2. However, SCBSs will
not interfere with D2D links as SUEs and SCBSs transmit
on two different orthogonal bands. This encourages UEs to
be served via D2D links which can improve the offloading
capabilities of the network.
The achievable rate for the transmission between an SN
k ∈ K and a user m ∈M over RB n ∈ Ni is
Φknm(γ
(i)
knm) = wn log(1 + γ
(i)
knm), (1)
where wn is the bandwidth of RB n and γ(i)knm is the instan-
taneous SINR for user m from SN k when using RB n. The
superscript i ∈ {1, 2, 3} indicates the set of RBs to which RB
n belongs. For i ∈ {1, 2} we have
γ
(i)
lnm =
plnhlnm∑
l′∈L,l′ 6=l pl′nhl′nm + σ
2
, (2)
where pln denotes the transmit power of SCBS l over RB
n. Moreover, m corresponds to an arbitrary UE and SUE,
respectively, for i = 1 and i = 2. For the transmissions over
N3, the SINR is given by:
γ(3)msnm =
pmsnhmsnm∑
m′s∈Ms,m
′
s 6=ms
pm′snhm′snm + σ
2
, (3)
where pmsn denotes the transmit power of SUE ms over RB
n and σ2 is the variance of the receiver’s Gaussian noise.
Given this model, one important problem is how to allocate
the bandwidth resources to the wireless users. As discussed in
Section I, beyond power allocation and interference manage-
ment techniques, we can boost the capacity of wireless net-
works by making the network better informed of its environ-
ment. Recent studies [27], [29], [30] have shown that friends in
social networks, e.g. Facebook, have many common interests
and activities that define their so-called social tie. Such social
ties’ strength could properly show how frequently people inter-
act with their friends, share popular videos or pictures, or invite
one another to activities of common interest. Therefore, such
interrelationships can explain how often socially connected
people request common contents [17], [20]–[23]. Observing
such behavior is interesting for SCN resource allocation, since
it motivates the possibility of serving a user directly by other
users with shared interests over D2D communication, instead
of requesting the content from SCBSs. Therefore, such scheme
allows the network to decrease redundant transmissions and
offload this traffic from the backhaul network. In fact, we
are investigating a content distribution model that allows the
network to use certain devices as SUEs, to serve as “caching
points” whose storage can be used to cache popular content
via overlay D2D. Therefore, our model is not a classical
cooperative communication or relaying system.
Fig. 2. A schematic of a D2D enabled SCN which exploits the context
information underneath the social network. The network in the right hand
side shows the Facebook friendship graph of user 4.
For example, consider the scenario shown in Fig. 2, where
a group of friends, e.g. students in a dorm or coworkers of
a company spend a significant amount of time each day in
neighboring rooms. Beyond this physical closeness, there is a
social relationship between users at a higher layer that can
underline their common interests in various topics such as
sports or media. Since these users might have mutual interests,
they are likely to be interested in common contents. Hence,
although the formation of social ties is an application oriented
metric, however, it strongly impacts how they access their
wireless services, thus, directly impacting resource allocation.
One illustrative example is the case in which one user, say
user 1, shares a certain video on the social network, which,
in turn, will be viewed by some of its friends, due to the
mutual interests. Hence, those users could be served using
data that may be cached at UE 1, directly through the D2D
link. Clearly, by knowing the social ties between the users,
the network will, on the one hand, be able to avoid multiple
transmission of the same data and, on the other hand, will be
able to allocate additional resources to the users outside the
social group. In this work, we use the term traffic offload to
refer to the reduction of redundant transmissions from SCBSs
to UEs that can be obtained by exploiting D2D links between
SUEs and UEs. Such traffic offload will alleviate the traffic on
the backhaul-constrained SCBSs while also allowing to service
additional users over the SCBSs’ RBs [18].
With this in mind, we propose to exploit, jointly with
conventional channel information, the users’ social interrela-
tionships in order to optimize resource allocation in D2D-
enabled SCNs. The resource allocation can be posed as an
optimization problem in which RBs are assigned to UEs
(ξ⋆ : N →M) such that the overall sum utility of the network
is maximized. Taking the social context into account, we can
formulate the problem as
maximize
ξ⋆
∑
k∈K
∑
n∈N
∑
m∈M
ξknmΩm(Φknm(γknm),Z), (4)
subject to
∑
k∈K
∑
m∈M
ξknm ≤ 1, ∀n ∈ N , (5)
∑
k∈K
∑
n∈N
ξknm ≤ 1, ∀m ∈ M, (6)
ξknm ∈ {0, 1}, (7)
where Z is a matrix that captures the social tie strength
between every user pair and will be formally defined in Section
III. Moreover, Ωm(.) is the utility of user m which is a
function of achievable rates and social ties. If user m is
connected to an SCBS, Ωm(.) simply represents the achievable
rate of the link. If user m is connected to an SUE, Ωm(.) is the
sum of the link’s achievable rate, plus a term that determines
how much user m is socially connected to the cluster. The
optimization problem in (4) aims to maximize the sum utility
of all users. The constraint in (5) ensures that each RB is
assigned to only one user, and the constraint in (6) ensures
that each user is assigned to one RB.
Due to the unplanned deployment of backhaul-constrained
SCBSs and the limited possibilities for SCBS coordination [4],
our goal is to develop a self-organizing, decentralized resource
allocation solution. This decentralized solution for the problem
in (4)-(7) will be addressed in depth in Section IV. Before
doing so, we formally define the social tie strength in the next
Section and explain how such context information could be
extracted from the social networks.
III. MODELING RELATIONSHIP STRENGTH IN SOCIAL
NETWORKS
A. Social Context in the Proposed SCN Model and SUE
Choice
Let zij denote the social tie strength between two UEs i
and j. We define the social tie as a metric that determines
how strong the relationship of two users is as inferred from
the social network. This metric should then be incorporated
into a proper utility function to be used in the context-aware
resource allocation problem in (4). In order to benefit from
caching at the edge, popular contents must be cached at UEs
that are chosen to serve as SUEs. Here, we assume that a
user is chosen as SUE ms if its total social influence Ims =∑
m∈M,m 6=ms
zmsm is larger than other users1. Ims can be
interpreted as a weighted degree of ms in a social network
graph where the edge weights are determined by the z term.
We note that network operators need to provide some form of
reward and incentive mechanisms to their users so that they
act as SUEs. We can now define the notion of a social cluster
1Without loss of generality, other approaches for selecting SUE can also
be accommodated.
Definition 1. A social cluster (SC) is defined as a set, Cms ,
composed of an SUE ms and all the UEs which are connected
to ms via D2D links.
We use the term social here to emphasize that the social
relationships of the users affect the formation of the cluster, as
will be elaborated in Section IV. Due to the social effects, we
can make the following observations: 1) a UE m is encouraged
by its friends to join the same SC in order to form socially
stronger clusters, 2) SUEs with larger clusters (more assigned
UEs) must get higher quality links from the N2 set, since the
quality of the link from SCBS to SUE indirectly affects the
quality of the direct D2D links, and 3) to improve offloading,
SCBSs have an incentive to encourage UEs, with at least one
friend as SUE, to use D2D links.
Such peer effects motivate the need for an advanced model
that can accurately define the strength of ties, zij . In [31], a
graphical model is proposed to learn the strength of ties among
a set of Facebook users which is suitable for our model. In
particular, based on the homophily property, it is observed that
the stronger the tie, the higher the similarity [30]. Therefore,
if two users have more attribute similarities in their profiles,
e.g., the common groups that two UEs are members of, or
the geographical locations, then their relationship is stronger.
The relationship strength can be modeled as a hidden effect of
profile similarities and inferred via statistical learning concepts
[29], [30]. In the following, we review a learning model based
on [31] that allows to understand how we can find the strength
of ties, z from a given social network dataset.
B. Learning Model
We note that the strength of the social relationship between
two user impacts the nature and frequency of online inter-
actions between a pair of users. Moreover, users naturally
invest more of their resources (e.g., time) to build and maintain
the relationships that they deem more important [31]. Hence,
as the relationship becomes stronger, it is more likely that a
certain type of interaction will take place between the pair of
users. In this way, we can model the relationship strength as
the hidden cause of user interactions.
Formally, let xi and xj be, respectively, the attribute vectors
of two UEs i and j. An attribute vector is a vector that
includes some of a user’s social profile information, such as the
user’s age, political view, major, or the level of education. The
relationship strength between i and j can be defined as a latent
variable zij which will be inferred for every pair of users. In
addition, let yij be the vector of interactions whose elements
yij,f , f = 1, ..., F are the F different interactions considered
between i and j. Essentially, the interactions include the
activities of UE i that involves UE j, e.g., tagging one another
or posting on each others’ walls. This variable is assumed
to be binary such that yij,f = 1 if this interaction has
occurred between UE i and UE j and yij,f = 0, otherwise.
Fig. 3. The graphical representation of the social tie strength model [31].
Furthermore, the vector eij,f = [e1ij,f , ..., eϑij,f ]T is defined
for each interaction f occurred between users i and j. This
vector can show how much user j is important for user i
to interact. For instance, if user i has tagged user j and
assuming ϑ = 1, then e1ij,f can be the overall number of
users that user i usually tags. Thus, smaller e1ij,f implies
stronger tie between users i and j. This social model can
be represented by a directed graphical model as shown in
Fig. 3. In this model, zij summarizes the profile similarities
and interactions between users i and j. However, it is not
observable from users’ profiles. Hence, we need to estimate
zij so as to maximize the overall observed data likelihood. To
this end, the joint distribution of z and y can be represented
using general factorization:
P (zij ,yij |xi,xj) = P (zij |xi,xj)
F∏
f=1
P (yij,f |zij). (8)
In order to infer the latent variables, we need to adopt the
conditional probability of the relationship strength given the
attribute similarities, i.e., P (zij |xi,xj). In this regard, we
consider the widely used Gaussian distribution [31]
P (zij |xi,xj) = N (w
T ζ(xi,xj), υ), (9)
where the similarity vector ζ(xi,xj) is the set of similarity
measures taken on the pair of users (i, j) and w denotes the
vector of parameters of the model in (9).
Now, in order to completely describe the joint distribution
in (8), the conditional probability of yij,f given zij and eij,f ,
can be modeled by using the logistic function:
P (yij,f = 1|uij,f ) =
1
1 + e−(̺
T
f
uij,f )
, (10)
where uij,f = [eij,f , zij ]T . Moreover, ̺f =
[̺f,1, ̺f,2, ..., ̺f,ϑ+1]
T are the parameters of the model
in (10) that must be estimated. From Fig. 3 and given latent
variable zij , all elements of yij become independent of each
other. Let D = {(i1, j1), (i2, j2), ..., (iD, jD)} be the set of
user sample pairs observed from the network. The variables
xi, xj , yij and eij,f could all be extracted from the social
network. Hence, conditioned to the attribute similarities and
model parameters, we can write (8) as:
P (zij ,yij |xi,xj ,w,̺) = (11)
∏
(i,j)∈D

P (zij |xi,xj ,w)
F∏
f=1
P (yij,f |zij ,̺f )

 .
Here, by substituting (9) and (10) in (11), the joint distribution
can be written as:
P (zij ,yij |xi,xj ,w,̺) ∝ (12)
∏
(i,j)∈D

e− 12υ (wT ζij−zij)2
F∏
f=1
e−(̺
T
f uij,f )(1−yij,f )
1 + e−(̺
T
f
uij,f )

 .
C. Inference
Given the defined learning model, we can now infer the
social tie strength between each arbitrary pair of users (i, j).
One way to estimate zij is to adopt the approach of [31]
in which zij is treated as a parameter. Essentially, we can
find the point estimates wˆ, ˆ̺, zˆ that maximize the likelihood
P (y, zˆ, wˆ, ˆ̺|x). To avoid overfitting the training dataset for
the model in (9) and (10), regularizers λw and λ̺ will be
used respectively for the parameters w and ̺ with Gaussian
priors. Overfitting can occur if the size of the w vector is too
large for the observed data from the attribute vector x. Using
(12), we have:
P (zij ,yij ,w,̺|xi,xj) = (13)
P (zij ,yij |xi,xj ,w,̺)P (w,̺|xi,xj),
and since the model parameters ω and ̺ are independent of
one another, as well as of the attributes of the users, we can
write the joint conditional distribution in (13) as
P (zij ,yij ,w,̺|xi,xj) = P (zij ,yij |xi,xj ,w,̺)P (w)P (̺).
(14)
and hence,
logP (zij ,yij ,w,̺|xi,xj) =
∑
(i,j)∈D
(
−
1
2υ
(
wT ζij − zij
)2)
+
∑
(i,j)∈D

 F∑
f=1
(
−(1− yij,f )(̺
T
f uij,f )−log
(
1 + e−(̺
T
f uij,f )
))
−
λw
2
wTw −
F∑
f=1
λ̺
2
̺Tf ̺f + C, (15)
where C is a constant. (15) is a concave function and, thus,
the latent variable and parameters can be derived by using
gradients of this function. Using the iterative Newton-Raphson
algorithm, we can maximize the function in (15) and find the
optimum values for zij , ̺f , and w. We denote Z as a M×M
matrix, where zij is the element of i-th row and j-th column.
Given the proposed wireless model of Section II along with
the inferred social tie metric Z, we are now able to account for
the social interconnections among users in conjunction with
the physical layer constrains of the D2D-enabled SCN. We
next develop a matching-based approach to allocate resources
in a social context aware SCN.
IV. CONTEXT-AWARE RESOURCE ALLOCATION AS A
MATCHING GAME
Having defined the social context, our next goal is to solve
the resource allocation problem in (4). The problem given by
(4), subject to (5)-(7), is a 0-1 integer programming, which is
a satisfiability problem as such one of Karp’s 21 NP-complete
problems [32]. Hence, it is difficult to solve this problem via
classical optimization approaches. Moreover, for a large-scale
SCN network with D2D communication, it is desirable to
solve the context-aware resource allocation problem in (4)-(7)
using a decentralized, self-organizing approach in which the
SCBSs and devices can interact and make resource allocation
decisions based on their local information without relying on
a centralized entity for coordination. In addition, owing to the
need for exploiting context information, it is of interest to
define individual SN or UE utilities that capture the locally
available context at each node.
To this end, matching theory is a promising approach to per-
form decentralized resource management in wireless networks
[8], [10], [11], [13], [33]. The main benefit of matching theory
is its ability to define individual utilities per UE and SNs as
well as the available algorithmic implementations that allow
to provide a largely decentralized and self-organizing solution
to the resource allocation problem in (4)-(7) while accounting
for all the nodes’ information. In essence, a matching game is
a situation in which two sets of players must be assigned to
one another, depending on their preferences. In a matching
game, each player must rank the players in the opposing
set using a preference relation which captures this player’s
evaluation of the players in the other set. In the studied
context-aware model, the preference relation can be based on
a variety of metrics related to the social and wireless realms.
In this regard, we formulate the proposed resource allocation
problem in SCNs as a two-sided one-to-one matching game
in which each SN-controlled RB n ∈ N will be assigned to
at most one user m ∈ M and vice versa. Therefore, we can
formulate the problem as a one-to-one matching game given
by the tuple (M,N ,≻M,≻N ). Here, ≻M= {≻m}m∈M and
≻N= {≻n}n∈N denote, respectively, the set of the preference
relation of users and RBs. We formally define the notion of a
matching:
Definition 2. A matching µ is defined as a function from the
set M∪N into the set of M∪N such that m = µ(n) if and
only if µ(m) = n.
Let Vm(.) and Un(.) denote, respectively, the utility function
of UE m and RB n. Given these utilities, we can say that a user
m prefers RB n1 to n2, if Vm(n1) > Vm(n2). This preference
is denoted by n1 ≻m n2. Similarly, an RB n prefers UE m1 to
m2, if Un(m1) > Un(m2) and this is denoted by m1 ≻n m2.
A. Users’ Preferences
Depending on whether an RB n is offered by an SUE or an
SCBS, the UEs will have different utility functions. Moreover,
the utility of one player may depend on the matching of other
players, due to the peer effects described in Section III-A. In
this regard, let amms;µ = {amms |µ} be a variable used to
determine the existence of a D2D link between UE m and
SUE ms, conditioned on the current matching µ. Similarly,
we use amms;µµ′ = {amms |µ, µ
′}, to indicate whether a
certain UE m is a member of Cms in both matchings µ and
µ′. The motivation for this definition will be explained in
Section V-B. Before computing the utilities, UEs first obtain
the corresponding channel response of each RB, from all SNs
and form a K×N channel coefficient matrix Hm. Using Hm,
each user m ∈ M shapes its achievable data rate matrix, i.e.
Φm, whose elements are given by (1)-(3). From (1) and (2), the
utilities of a UE and an SUE, respectively, for RBs n1 ∈ N1
and n2 ∈ N2, are given by:
Vmni,l(γ
(i)
lnm) = wni log
(
1 + γ
(i)
lnm
)
, (16)
where m corresponds to a UE (i = 1) or an SUE (i = 2).
From (3), the utility of a user m using an RB n ∈ N3 is given
by:
Vmn,ms(Z, γ
(3)
msnm
, µ) = (17)
wn log
(
1 + γ(3)msnm
)
+ αm

zmms + ∑
j∈Mu\m
ajms;µµ′zmj

 ,
where αm is a weighting parameter that allows to control the
impact of the social ties on the overall decision of the user. The
utilities given by (16) state that UEs and SUEs, respectively,
rank RBs n1 ∈ N1 and n2 ∈ N2 based only on the achievable
rates. However, (17) captures the peer effects on the UEs’
preferences for RBs n ∈ N3. A UE can benefit more from the
mutual interests among the SC members, if the SC members
are more socially connected with one another and with the
UE. The second term in (17) implies that the UE prefers to
join an SC that has stronger ties with it.
B. SN-based RBs’ Preferences
The proposed matching game can be fully represented once
the preference of each RB is defined. The decision of an RB
n ∈ N is mainly controlled by the SCBS or SUE that is
using it. Hence, in the proposed game, SCBSs and SUEs make
decisions on behalf of their RBs. In the considered model,
there are three groups of RBs, each of which has a different
preference over the UEs. Similar to Section IV-A, we define
a novel scheme at the RB side of the game, which is based
on the information extracted from the corresponding social
network. For the transmission between SCBS l ∈ L and UE
m ∈ Mu, over RB n ∈ N1, the utility of RB n ∈ N1 when
choosing UE m is given by:
Unm,l(Z, γ
(1)
lnm) = wn log
(
1 + γ
(1)
lnm
)
− βn(
∑
j∈Ms
zmj).
(18)
Hence, m1 ≻n m2 if and only if Unm1,l > Unm2,l. βn is
a weighting parameter that controls the impact of the social
context. The second term in the right hand side of (18) implies
that RBs n ∈ N1 give less utility to UEs who can be served
by an SUE.
In addition, the utility achieved by RB n ∈ N2 when
selecting SUE ms, Unms,l is given by
Unms,l(Z, γ
(2)
lnms
, µ) = wn log
(
1 + γ
(2)
lnms
)
+ νn ·Xms ,
(19)
where Xms =
∑
m∈Mu
amms;µzmms is the total cumulative
social tie strength of a particular SUE ms and νn is a
weighting parameter that controls the importance of the SC
that the SUE has formed in RB n’s utility. The utility function
in (19) promotes SUEs with higher social ties since they are
likely to form larger SCs. Finally, the utility of RB n ∈ N3
for user m via D2D link from SUE ms is given by
Unm,ms(γ
(3)
msnm
) = wn log
(
1 + γ(3)msnm
)
+ κnzmms . (20)
The utility function in (20) implies that UEs must be accepted
based on both quality of the D2D link and social context. κn
is a weighting parameter and implies that how important the
role of social tie is for RB n ∈ N3 of an SUE ms ∈ Ms in
accepting a UE m ∈Mu.
V. PROPOSED CONTEXT-AWARE RESOURCE ALLOCATION
ALGORITHM
Given the formulated context-aware matching game, our
goal is to find a stable matching, which is one of the key
solution concepts in matching theory [33]. Let A(M,N )
denote the set of all possible matchings, and µ(m,n) denote
a subset of A(M,N ), where m and n are matched together.
Then, we define a stable matching as follows:
Definition 3. A pair (m,n) /∈ µ, where m ∈ M, n ∈ N
is said to be a blocking pair for the matching µ, if there is
another matching µ′ ∈ µ(m,n), where µ′ ≻m µ and µ′ ≻n
µ. A matching µ∗ is stable if and only if there is no blocking
pair.
A stable matching solution for resource allocation problem
in (4)-(7) ensures that after allocating resources to the users, no
RB-UE or RB-SUE pair in SCN would benefit from replacing
their current association with a new link. That is, no user
can benefit by changing its assigned frequency resource and
vice versa. For the proposed context-aware resource allocation
game, we can make the following observation:
Remark 1. The proposed SCN matching game has peer
effects.
The RBs and users in a context-aware resource allocation
game may change their preferences as the game evolves. That
is, the preference of one player may depend on the preferences
of the other players. For instance, the peer effects introduced
in Section III-A make the preferences of RBs and users
interdependent, due to the social interrelationships among
users. This type of game is known as the matching game with
peer effects, in which players have preference ordering over
the set of all possible matchings A(M,N ) [34]. This is in
contrast with the traditional matching games in which players
have fixed preference ordering [10]–[13], [33].
For traditional matching games such as in [10]–[13], [33],
one can use the deferred acceptance algorithm, originally
introduced in [35], to find a stable matching. However, such
an algorithm may not be able to converge to a stable matching
when the game has peer effects [33], such as in the proposed
context-aware resource allocation model. Therefore, there is a
need to develop new algorithms, that significantly differ from
existing applications of matching theory in wireless such as
[10]–[13], so as to find the solution of the studied matching
game.
A. Proposed Socially-Aware Resource Allocation Algorithm
To solve the formulated matching game, we propose a
novel algorithm for resource allocation in D2D-enabled SCNs.
Table I shows the various stages of this proposed socially-
aware resource allocation (SARA) algorithm that allows to
solve the SCNs’ matching game.
The proposed algorithm is composed of four main stages:
Stage 1 includes the matching of SUEs with RBs n ∈ N2,
Stage 2 focuses on the matching of UEs with RBs n ∈
N1 ∪N3, Stage 3 focuses on updating the SC information, and
Stage 4 during which the actual downlink transmission occurs.
Initially, the SCBSs use the knowledge of social ties among
users to choose the SUEs as discussed in III-A. Each SCBS
sends a proposal to its neighboring users that are deemed
influential enough to be an SUE. UEs accept or reject the
proposals and the SCBSs broadcast the set of SNs, K, and the
sets of RBs, Ni, i = 1, 2, 3.
After initialization, each SUE applies for n ∈ N2 based on
(16) and each RB accepts the most preferred UE and rejects
other proposals based on the utilities defined in (19). Stage 1
terminates once each SUE is accepted by an RB or rejected by
all its preferred RBs. This matching remains unchanged until
SUEs update the cluster Cms , ∀ms ∈ Ms, sets. However, the
new context information changes the preferences of the RBs
for SUEs based on (19). That is due to the fact that Xms =
TABLE I
PROPOSED SOCIAL CONTEXT-AWARE RESOURCE ALLOCATION
ALGORITHM
Inputs: L,M,N ,H,Z
Initialize: SCBSs send proposal to high influential UEs to act as SUE.
SCBSs broadcast the set K and announce the set of available RBs in
N1, N2, and N3. Initialize the set of Cms for each SUE as an empty
set.
Stage 1:
(a) SUEs determine their preference ordering for RBs n ∈ N2,
using (16).
(b) RBs n ∈ N2 calculate utility of each SUE applicant using
(19) for the current state of the matching.
(c) SUEs apply for RBs n ∈ N2 and get accepted or rejected
via the deferred acceptance algorithm.
Stage 2:
(a) UEs apply for RBs n ∈ N1 and n ∈ N3, using (16) and
(17), respectively.
(b) RBs n ∈ N1 and n ∈ N3 calculate utility of each UE
applicant using (18) and (20), respectively.
(c) UEs get accepted or rejected by RBs n ∈ N1 ∪ N3 through
deferred acceptance algorithm.
Stage 3:
(a) Update SC information, Cms for ∀ms ∈ Ms.
(b) SUEs broadcast SC information of the current matching, i.e.,
amms;µ coefficients to their nearby UEs.
while Cms ,∀ms ∈ Ms remain unchanged for two consecutive
matchings
repeat Stage 1 to Stage 3
Stage 4:
(a) For any cluster member, SUE determines if the current
requested data exists in its directory.
(b) Actual downlink transmission of data occurs from each RB
to its matched SUE or UE.
Output: Stable matching µ∗
∑
m∈Mu
amms;µzmms determines how much the members of
an SUE’s cluster are socially connected. A larger Xms implies
that the members can benefit more from D2D due to common
interests in their requested data. Therefore, RBs n ∈ N2 prefer
to be matched to an SUE with larger Xms . Due to the change
in their preference ordering, SUEs and RBs n ∈ N2 need to
repeat this stage once the context information is updated.
Following the first stage, UEs apply for n ∈ N1 or n ∈ N3,
based on the utilities defined in (16) and (17), respectively.
The SCBSs and SUEs controlling RBs n ∈ N1 and n ∈ N3,
accept the UE that gives the higher utility based, respectively,
on (18) and (20), and reject the rest of the applicants. As long
as Cms , ∀ms ∈ Ms, do not change, UEs have strict preference
over RBs n ∈ N1 ∪ N3 and vice versa. Stage 2 ends once
each UE is accepted by one RB or rejected by all RBs of its
preference list.
All clusters are subject to change due to the peer effects
in the matching game. Thus, players need to update their
preferences based on the new Cms , ∀ms ∈ Ms, information
resulted from Stage 2. In Stage 3, each SUE ms updates the
SC information, i.e. Cms ,ms ∈Ms, based on the results of the
current matching and broadcasts Cms set to its nearby UEs and
the corresponding SCBS. According to this information, play-
ers sort their preferences conditioned on the current matching.
The algorithm terminates, once the Cms ,ms ∈Ms sets do not
change for two consecutive matchings. In the final stage, once
the matching is complete, the downlink transmission of the
UEs occurs, using the allocated resource blocks. This stage is
essentially the actual communication stage in the D2D-enabled
SCN.
B. Convergence and Stability of the Proposed Algorithm
In this subsection, we prove the stability of the algorithm
proposed in Table I. Prior to doing so, we make the following
definition:
Definition 4. Given the social interrelationship between UEs,
an SC Cms is said to be S-stable, if both of the following
conditions are satisfied:
1) No UE m outside the cluster Cms can join it. That is, for
any m /∈ Cms and n ∈ N3 belonging to ms, there is no pair
(m,n) /∈ µ where m ≻n µ(n) and n ≻m µ(m).
2) No UE m inside the Cms can leave the cluster. That is, for
any m ∈ Cms and n ∈ N1 ∪ N3 that does not belong to ms,
there is no pair (m,n) /∈ µ where m ≻n µ(n) and n ≻m
µ(m).
A matching is S-stable, if and only if all the clusters are S-
stable.
This notion of stability guarantees that the peer effects
cannot make a UE outside the SCs join a cluster. In addition,
the UEs inside SCs will not leave or change their clusters.
However, it is not sufficient to ensure the required two-sided
stability of the matching. Next, we discuss a property of the
proposed game and show why the S-stability of SCs is non-
trivial.
Proposition 1. Given the information on the social clusters,
once a UE m is accepted by an RB of a particular SC, µ(m)
will not reject m in favor of any new applicant. However, this
does not imply UE m has no incentive to leave the cluster.
Proof: First, consider the game at its initial state where
no UE has been assigned to any SUE (no SC is formed).
That is,
∑
j∈Mu\m
ajms;µµ′zmj = 0 and Vmn,ms =
wn log
(
1 + γ
(3)
msnm
)
+ αmzmms for ∀m ∈ Mu. Thus, from
(17), a UE m that applies for RB n ∈ N3 during the first
matching will do so only due to the higher achievable rates
plus social tie with the corresponding SUE. Without loss of
generality, the preference ordering of UE m is identified with
two sets U and W , where
U = {∀n′ ∈ N1|Vmn′,l > Vmn,ms}
∪ {∀n′ ∈ N3|Vmn′,ms > Vmn,ms};
W = {∀n′ ∈ N1|Vmn′,l < Vmn,ms}
∪ {∀n′ ∈ N3|Vmn′,ms < Vmn,ms}. (21)
In (21), U and W , represent the set of all RBs that are,
respectively, more preferred and less preferred to UE m than
RB n. Thus, the preference ordering of UE m can be denoted
by U ≻m n ≻m W . In Stage 2, the process of acceptance or
rejection of applicants is done in a manner analogous to the
conventional deferred acceptance algorithm [10]. Thus, we can
ensure that, for a given SC setting, each n ∈ N3 has accepted,
out of the applicants, the UE that
µ(n) = maximize
m
Unm,ms(γ
(3)
msnm
)
= maximize
m
wn log
(
1 + γ(3)msnm
)
+ κn · zmms . (22)
Therefore, if another UE m′ applies for the RB n during the
next matching µ′, then necessarily n′ = µ(m′) ∈ W , if UE m′
is not unmatched. This is due to the fact that, if n′ = µ(m′) ∈
U , then it means that UE m′ already satisfies (22) for RB n′,
and hence, it will be accepted by n′, before applying to n.
Now, since µ(m′) ∈ W , we can conclude that Unm′,ms <
Unm,ms ; since otherwise, µ(m′) = n which contradicts (22).
In other words, the UEs who are accepted in the first iteration
will not be rejected by their match as the game proceeds.
We can hold the same argument for the next iterations.
Nevertheless, this does not imply that UE m necessarily stays
in its cluster forever. To show this, we give an example.
Example: With this example, we show that UEs may alter the
S-stability of the clusters. Given two UEs m and m′, two RBs
n ∈ N1 and n′ ∈ N3, and two SUEs ms1 and ms2, assume
that Vmn;ms1 > Vmn′;ms2 before any SC is formed and let the
current matching be Cms1 = {ms1,m} with µ(m) = n and
Cms2 = {ms2,m
′} with µ(m′) = n′. Once the SC information
is updated for UEs, the utility of UE m for RBs n and n′ might
change to Vmn;ms1 < Vmn′;ms2 , due to its social tie with m′.
Therefore, m will leave its current cluster Cms1 and will join
Cms2 . Due to this move, both clusters are not considered S-
stable.
Based on the Proposition 1, we can show the S-stability
of the proposed context-aware resource allocation game as
follows:
Theorem 1. Each SC becomes S-stable after a finite number
of iterations and, thus, the proposed algorithm in Table I is
guaranteed to converge.
Proof: From Proposition 1, each n ∈ N3 will not reject its
current match µ(n), in favor of other applicants. Thus, a new
UE m can join an SC, only if it applies for an unmatched
n ∈ N3. After each matching is done, more UEs will join
SCs, due to the non-negative social effect they impose on one
another. Eventually, there is a stage where no more UEs prefer
to join clusters.
There can be only two possibilities if a UE m with
µ(m) ∈ N3 can leave its cluster, and thus, alter the S-
stability condition: Case 1: there is an unmatched n ∈ N1
such that n ≻m µ(m), and Case 2: there is an unmatched
n ∈ N3 corresponding to another cluster where, again, we
have n ≻m µ(m). Next, we show that even when either Case
1 or Case 2 occurs, the current SC will converge to an S-stable
SC.
For the first case, we can check that UE m has surely been
rejected in previous matchings by an RB n ∈ N1 such that
n ≻m µ(m). Here, since µ(n) is matched to another player
and RB n is unmatched now, m will be accepted by RB n.
If µ(n) never applies again for RB n, then we can ensure
that UE m will not be rejected by n, since it satisfies µ(n) =
maximizem Unm,l(γ
(1)
lnm). Thus, UE m will not get back to its
SC again. If µ(n) applies again to RB n, then RB n will reject
m. However, µ(n) cannot cycle between RB n and another RB
n′ for unlimited number of iterations. This is due to the fact
that, if µ(n) oscillates between n and another RB n′ ∈ N3, the
reason is due to the peer effect by a current SC member m′′
who also oscillates between n′ and another RB. However, µ(n)
will set aµ(n)m′′;µµ′ = 0, if m′′ does not stay in SC for two
consecutive matchings. Therefore, µ(n) has to finally decide
between n and n′ after finite iterations. Moreover, if an RB
n′ ∈ N1 is the reason due to which µ(n) cycles, then similarly
we can show that µ(n′) will have to stop the oscillation after
a finite number of iterations. Consequently, µ(n) will stop
oscillation.
Case 2 implies that some of the friends of UE m has
encouraged m to join their cluster. Here, if UE m joins the
new SC, it will never prefer the previous SC to new one,
unless some of its friends, say m′, leave the cluster. Then,
UE m ignores the peer effect of m′ by setting amm′;µµ′ = 0
and reorganizes its preference ordering. After a finite number
of iterations, the friends’ list who stay in the cluster will not
change and, thus, UE m stays in the new cluster or comes back
to the previous cluster and will never cycle between those two.
In addition, if the incentive for UE m to join RB n′ of the new
cluster does not stem from the friendship relationship, then,
this implies that n′ ≻m µ(m) and UE m has been rejected
by n′ in previous matchings. Thus, similar to the previous
case, we can observe that after finite iterations, the µ(n′) stops
oscillating, and, hence, UE m will decide whether to stay with
µ(m) or leave it.
Given the results in Proposition 1 and Theorem 1, we can
now state the main result with regard to the two-sided stability
of the matching.
Theorem 2. The proposed algorithm in Table I is guaranteed
to reach a two-sided stable matching between users and RBs.
Proof: In order to prove the two-sided stability, we need
to show that there is no blocking pair (m,n) or (ms, n) that
meets either of the following:
(m,n) /∈ µ | µ(m) ∈ N3 , n ∈ N1 ∪N3; (23)
(ms, n) /∈ µ | ms ∈ Ms , n ∈ N2; (24)
(m,n) /∈ µ | µ(m) ∈ N1 , n ∈ N1 ∪N3. (25)
All SCs are S-stable once the algorithm terminates since,
otherwise, the SC sets will be different from those in previous
matching which contradicts the termination condition.
From Theorem 1, we can see that no UE m having µ(m) ∈
N3 would make a blocking pair with any RB n1 ∈ N1 or
n3 ∈ N3 from another cluster, due to the S-stability of all
clusters. In addition, the matching of RBs n ∈ N3 belonging
to SUE ms and UEs in Cms is done through the deferred
acceptance algorithm. Therefore, these players will not form
a blocking pair. Consequently, there is no blocking pair that
satisfies (23).
In addition, the preferences of RBs n ∈ N2 become strictly
fixed, once the S-stability is satisfied at all clusters. Then,
followed by the deferred acceptance algorithm, we ensure that
the given matching between SUEs and RBs n ∈ N2 is stable
and there is no blocking pair that satisfies (24).
Finally, no RB n ∈ N3 makes a blocking pair with any
m where µ(m) ∈ N1, due to the S-stability of all clusters.
Moreover, the matching of RBs n ∈ N1 and UEs m where
µ(m) ∈ N1 is followed by the deferred acceptance algorithm.
Therefore, these players will not form a blocking pair and there
is no blocking pair that satisfies (28). Hence, the proposed
SARA algorithm is guaranteed to reach a two-sided stable
matching for all D2D and cellular links.
C. Complexity Analysis of the Proposed Algorithm
In order to analyze the computational complexity of the
proposed algorithm, we can start by investigating the simple
case in which the matching game has no peer effect, i.e., users
and RBs have strict preference ordering. Here, we consider
two cases: 1) when the number of UEs is less than the total
number of RBs, i.e., Mu ≤ NT , where NT = N1×L+N3×
Ms and 2) when the number of UEs is greater than the total
number of RBs, i.e., Mu > NT . Our goal is to analyze the
worst case scenario, i.e., the maximum number of iterations
and the maximum number of matching proposals sent from
UEs to either SCBSs or SUEs (which relate to the messaging
overhead). In each iteration, UEs send a proposal to their most
preferred RB, and RBs receive the proposals, accept the most
preferred one and reject the other UEs. Therefore, it is clear
that the number of unmatched UEs at each iteration is equal or
less than the number of unmatched UEs at previous iterations.
For the first case, once the algorithm converges, all the UEs
are matched, since RBs prefer any UE to being unallocated.
We can easily observe that the worst case happens, if all UEs
have the same preference ordering. Hence, at the end of each
iteration t, there are Mu − t unmatched UEs. Therefore, the
maximum number of iterations, tmax, is obtained when all the
users are matched, i.e., Mu−tmax = 0. Hence, the complexity
is of the order O(Mu). Furthermore, at each iteration t, Mu−
t+1 proposals are sent. Hence, the messaging overhead, Smax,
is equal to:
Smax =
tmax∑
t=1
(Mu − t+ 1) =
Mu(Mu + 1)
2
. (26)
Similarly for the second case, we know that once the
algorithm converges, there are exactly Mu − NT unmatched
users. Again, the worst case happens, if all UEs have the same
preference ordering. Hence, at each iteration, only one UE gets
accepted. Therefore, the maximum number of iterations, tmax,
is obtained when there are Mu−NT unmatched users, i.e., the
complexity is of the order O(NT ). The messaging overhead
is equal to:
Smax =
tmax∑
t=1
(Mu − t+ 1) = (27)
NT∑
t=1
(Mu − t+ 1) = (Mu + 1)NT −
NT (NT + 1)
2
.
As we see from the above equations, for Mu < NT , the
complexity of the matching algorithm increases linearly with
the number of users. In addition, the messaging overhead
exhibits quadratic increase with respect to the number of users.
Moreover, for Mu > NT , the upperbound for complexity is
independent of the number of users.
The complexity of the proposed context-aware algorithm
will further depend on the social matrix Z. However, for a
given SCs, the complexity of our algorithm follows the above
analysis. From Theorem 1, we know that SCs change only
for a finite number of iterations. Hence, we can anticipate
that the overall complexity of the context-aware approach be
linearly proportional to the complexity of the context-unaware
approach.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. Social Context Dataset and Simulation Parameters
For the evaluation of our results, we first use the learning
model introduced in Section III. We have computed the social
tie matrix Z, for a set of 80 users from the Facebook network.
We have used the real dataset released by Stanford University
[36], which is generated by surveying a number of volunteer
Facebook users, known as ego nodes. For the selected ego
node, the dataset contains 224 anonymized attributes for each
user, including education, gender, location, language, and
work, among others. In addition, the dataset specifies 32
anonymized circles and determines which subset of users are
in which circle. Each circle is a group, composed of a subset
of users, which can be thought as a high school institution or
a company. For our simulations, we assume that if two users i
and j are within at least one common circle, then they interact
with each other on Facebook. Finally, in order to determine the
tendency of user i to interact with another user j, we consider
the degree of user i in the ego network, i.e., the number of
friends of user i. The motivation behind this assumption can
be explained as follows: if user i picks user j to interact with
from a larger number of friends, this implies that user j is
more important to user i than other users.
In order to select the SUEs, we choose the four users with
the highest weighted degree from the ego network. Thus,
in our simulations, we have Ms = 4 and the weights are
determined by the social tie strength z for each pair of users.
We consider L = 7 SCBSs distributed randomly within a
square area of 2 km × 2 km. The number of active RBs for
SCBS to UE link, SCBS to SUE link, and SUE to UE link,
respectively, are N1 = 5, N2 = 3, and N3 = 5, unless stated
otherwise. Here, we would like to note that depending on the
channel state information and social ties among users, spec-
trum partitioning can be done dynamically and the proposed
model is not limited to any specific resource partitioning. In
this work, however, we assume that throughout the resource
allocation, neither the social tie matrix Z, nor the channel
state information are changing and therefore, the partitions
are static. Each RB is composed of 12 consecutive subcarriers,
each of which having a 15 KHz bandwidth, according to 3GPP
Rel-12 Standard [37]. The transmit power of SCBSs and SUEs
are set to 2 W and 10 mW, respectively. The wireless channel
experiences Rayleigh fading, with the propagation loss set to 3.
The receivers’ noise is assumed Gaussian with zero mean and
with variance equals to −90 dBm. The weighting parameters,
αm, βn, νn and κn are set to half of the RB bandwidth.
Throughout the simulations, the unmatched users are assigned
a zero utility. All statistical results are averaged over a large
number of independent runs for different locations and channel
gains.
For comparison purposes, we compare our proposed ap-
proach with two centralized approaches: 1) the context-aware
centralized solution which aims to maximize the overall util-
ities of all UEs and RBs, 2) the context-unaware centralized
approach, that maximizes the throughput of the users. In
simulation results, the centralized solutions refer to the linear
programming relaxation of the original 0-1 integer program-
ming problem in (4)-(7) by letting 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1. To obtain
centralized solutions in our simulations, we used the YALMIP
toolbox of MATLAB. In addition, we compare our results with
the context-unaware distributed algorithm that is based on the
one-to-one matching game similar to our proposed algorithm,
however, no social context is incorporated. That is, UEs and
RBs rank one another only based on the maximum SINR
values. This benchmark algorithm is in line with some existing
works such as [11] and [10].
In addition, we show the effect of context-awareness by
comparing the offloaded traffic of both approaches as one of
the main performance metrics in our results. We define the
offloaded traffic as the number of users who will be served
directly by data that is cached in a directory or folder at
the level of the SUE. The users obtain this offloaded traffic
via D2D communications without having to use the SCN’s
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Fig. 4. Comparison of the average social tie of SCs for proposed SARA
algorithm with other three approaches.
infrastructure, due to the correlation in their requests for
content as discussed in Section III. To compute this offloaded
traffic, we must find the probability Pm(yd = 1) of requesting
content that already exists in the directory of SUE ms by each
UE m ∈ Cms :
Pm(yd = 1) =
∑
d∈Dms
Pm(yd = 1|d ∈ Dms)P (d ∈ Dms),
(28)
where d and Dms denote, respectively, the requested file
and the set of files of the SUE ms’s directory. The Prior
information, P (d ∈ Dms) in (28), depends on both the history
of requested files in previous time slots and on the mutual
social tie between all members of the SC. Finding a closed-
form solution for (28) to model the correlation between users
in the time domain is difficult. Thus, for simplicity, we assume
that requesting a file from the directory of an SUE can be
modeled as an interaction yd between the user and its SC set.
Motivated by (10), we model Pm(yd = 1) as a function of
cluster’s average social tie z¯ms = 1|Cms |−1
∑
m∈Cms
zmms , as
follows
Pm(yd = 1) =
1
1 + e(−ρz¯ms )
; ∀m ∈ Cms , (29)
where ρ is a constant normalizing parameter. Equation (29)
allows to relax the dependencies between users by considering
average social tie of the cluster.
B. Simulation Results and Discussions
In Fig. 4, we show the average social tie in the final
clusters resulting from the proposed approach and the other
three algorithms. Clearly, from this figure, we can observe
that the members of the clusters in average are much more
socially connected in SARA compared to the context-unaware
approach. Fig. 4 shows that the average cluster social tie is up
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Fig. 5. Comparison of the average sum rate of the proposed SARA algorithm
and other three approaches.
to 77% higher for the proposed SARA algorithm relative to the
context-unaware scenario for Mu = 70 UEs. As the number of
users increases and the SCBS resources become more scarce,
UEs have no choice but to join the D2D clusters. However,
Fig. 4 shows that by using the proposed SARA algorithm,
the UEs will be more socially connected within their clusters
and can benefit more from the social interconnections of one
another.
In Fig. 5, the average sum rate of all users is compared
for the SARA algorithm with the distributed context-unaware
approach and centralized approaches. It is not surprising to see
that the average sum rate of our proposed approach is slightly
below that of an algorithm that is focused on optimizing only
the data rate. Fig. 5 shows that the gap between the two
algorithms does not exceed 3% for all network sizes. However,
as will be shown in Fig. 6, this small loss in average rate
will be compensated by having more offloaded traffic in the
downlink of the SCN. Interestingly, the rate performance of
the proposed approach is very close to the centralized solution
and the gape between the two algorithms does not exceed 4%
for all network sizes.
Fig. 6 compares the average offloaded traffic at each time
slot for the proposed algorithm and other three approaches
as the number of users varies. We note that for the context-
unaware approaches, the contents stored in the SUE’s direc-
tory do not depend on the average social tie of the social
cluster. Considering ρ = 0 in (29) allows us to model this
independence. The average offloaded traffic determines how
many of UEs in average could be served directly by data
that is cached in the SUEs’ directories. The offloaded traffic
increases with the number of users, since more UEs will move
to the D2D tier. However, this metric will saturate for the
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Fig. 6. Comparison of the average offloaded traffic between the proposed
SARA algorithm and other three approaches. The ρ = 0.5 and ρ = 0
is assumed, respectively, for context-aware algorithms and context-unaware
approaches.
large network sizes, since the number of RBs n ∈ N3 is
limited. We can see that the proposed approach achieves a very
close performance to the context-aware centralized solution, in
terms of traffic offloads, for the network size with more than
Mu = 40 UEs. Moreover, we observe that the performance
of the context-unaware approach coincides with the central
solution. This is primarily due to the fact that context-unaware
approach follows the deferred acceptance algorithm which is
known to achieve optimal solution for the proposing players
(i.e. users) [10], [35]. In Fig. 6, we can see that the proposed
SARA algorithm outperforms the context-unaware approach
by increasing the offloaded traffic for different network sizes.
Fig. 6 shows that the proposed SARA algorithm can offload
up to 84% more traffic from the SCN’s infrastructure when
compared to the context-unaware approach for a network with
Mu = 70 UEs.
In Fig. 7, we show the average offloaded traffic for different
values of the ρ parameter in (29) and different number of
users. One interesting observation from Fig. 7 is that the
proposed SARA algorithm offloads more traffic as the network
size grows and eventually saturates, since the number of RBs
is fixed. In fact, Fig. 7 implies that, at the cost of a slight
reduction in the average rate of the matched users (see Fig.
5), the proposed SARA algorithm allows to admit more users
into the network. Hence, the proposed approach can be used
to optimize the tradeoff between serving more users in a
congested network and the average rate of current users. By
properly setting the control parameters in the utility functions,
this tradeoff can be balanced according to the traffic of the
network.
In Fig. 8, we show the average offloaded traffic resulting
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Fig. 7. The average offloaded traffic resulted by proposed SARA algorithm,
versus different Mu and different values of ρ.
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Fig. 8. Comparison of the average offloaded traffic for the proposed SARA
algorithm with other three approaches, versus different number of RBs n ∈
N3. The values Mu = 30 and N1 = 5 is assumed and the parameter ρ is
set to 0.1.
from the proposed SARA algorithm and other approaches as
the number of RBs n ∈ N3 varies for a network with Mu = 30
UEs. This figure shows that, as the number of SUE resources
increases, the context-aware approach achieves better offload
performance. That is due to the fact that more users with
shared interests can join the same cluster which results to
form stronger social clusters. In Fig. 8, we can see that the gap
between the offloaded traffic of the proposed SARA algorithm
and the context-unaware approach consistently increases as the
network sizes grows. Fig. 8 shows that the proposed SARA
algorithm can offload up to 78% more traffic from the SCN’s
infrastructure when compared to the context-unaware approach
for a network with N3 = 8 RBs.
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Fig. 9. Average number iterations of the proposed SARA algorithm vs
network size, for different number of RBs. The error bars indicate the 95%
confidence.
the proposed SARA algorithm versus the network size Mu, for
two different RB numbers. In this figure, we can see that, as
the number of UEs increases, the average number of iterations
increases due to the increase in the number of players. Fig.
9 demonstrates that the proposed matching approach has a
reasonable convergence time that does not exceed an average
of 72 iterations for all network sizes and with N1 = 5, N2 = 3,
and N3 = 5 number of RBs. The maximum of the average
number of iterations reduces to 40, when there are N1 = 3,
N2 = 3, and N3 = 3 RBs.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a novel approach for
context-aware resource allocation in D2D-enabled small cell
networks. We have formulated the context-aware resource
allocation problem as a one-to-one matching game and we
have shown that the game exhibits peer effects. To solve the
game, we have proposed a distributed social-aware resource
allocation algorithm that exploits the physical layer metrics
of the wireless network along with the users’ social ties from
the underlaid social network. Then, we have shown that the
proposed algorithm is guaranteed to converge to a two-sided
stable matching between the users and the network’s resource
blocks. Simulation results have shown that the proposed
matching-based algorithm yields socially well-connected clus-
ter between D2D links, thus, allowing to offload significantly
more traffic than conventional context-unaware approach. The
results provide novel insights into the gains that future wireless
networks can achieve from exploiting social context. The
results show that with manageable complexity, the proposed
context-aware approach can substantially improve the wireless
resource utilization by offloading a large amount of traffic
from the backhaul-constrained small cell network. This work
can be extended to dynamic resource allocation in which the
spectrum partitioning may vary, depending on the social tie
strength among users.
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